A smoke plume can be seen en route to the incident and there is little if any wind disturbing the plume. You arrive at the front of the house/structure on a fire appliance/engine with a crew of four, consisting of an Incident Commander, Driver/Pump operator and two fire-fighters.

From your vantage point at the front of the house/structure upon arrival you observe that there is black smoke in all the visible lower floor rooms and the windows are still intact and the front door is also intact and in the closed position.

There is black smoke in all the visible upper floor rooms and all the windows are intact, except the front bedroom window above the porch, which is open and has black smoke emitting from the window sill upwards and is steadily moving out of the window.

An adult (occupier of the house/structure) meets you on your arrival adjacent to the front door and explains that they have jumped to safety out of the open front bedroom window with one child via the porch and that there are three more children still trapped on the upper floor of the house/structure. The staircase to the upper floor is directly behind the front door entrance.

What actions would you take?

How would you deploy your crew and resources?

What is your priority?

Where is the fire?

What is all that black smoke telling you and is it's movement out of the upper floor window significant?

Additional information

The premises is a known as a Duplex in the United States of America (USA), which is the equivalent to a semi-detached house in the United Kingdom (UK) and there is no basement to the property.

If you have decided to carry out a walk around the building you would observe the following signs of fire development at the rear of the premises as shown in the diagram below:

The external door to the kitchen is intact and in the closed position.

There are flames issuing from the top half of the upper kitchen window and 'air' entering in the bottom half of the upper kitchen window. There is black smoke visible through the lower kitchen window, which is also still in tact.

There is black smoke visible through the intact lower floor window to the left of the external kitchen door.

There is grey smoke visible through the intact lower floor window to the right of the flames issuing from the kitchen window.

There is black smoke visible through three of the intact upper floor windows and grey smoke visible through the remaining intact upper floor window.

There are no visible signs of smoke emitting from the roof void.

The adjacent premises has no visible signs of smoke through its windows.

Now it's make your mind up time and deploy.

If you'd like to e-mail your response and give permission for it to be posted on this web site. I will make available the various deployments for consideration and evaluation and identify the numbers of respondents who chose that type of deployment and we can share our experiences generically and hopefully all learn from each other.

JohnTaylor@SmokeBurns.com

If you decided to deploy your fire-fighting crew through the front door and left the front door open. Please examine the front and rear elevations of the house/structure to observe the possible changes in the fire development process approximately two/three minutes after the front door has been opened:

Front Elevation

The movement of the black smoke emitting from the front bedroom window on the upper floor has increased and there is black smoke now emitting with force out of the open front door and the horizontal position of the neutral zone (bottom edge of the black smoke layer) is approximately halfway in the doorway. However, as yet, there are no flames visible at either of these two exit ports at the front of the building.

Rear Elevation

The flames are now issuing from the entire opening of top half of the kitchen window, subsequently there is no 'air' entering the house/structure from the rear of the premises and the bottom half of the kitchen window is still intact.

Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA)

What do the observed changes in fire development indicate to you as an operational fire-fighter and are you going to amend your tactics based on a dynamic risk assessment of the fast moving circumstances and re-deploy?

With the front door now open, where is the 'air' supply to this fire?

Are there any other life critical safety factors to consider?

Basically what are these signs of fire development telling me?

Again, if you'd like to share your thoughts and deployment on the scenario thus far via e-mail I'd be grateful.

JohnTaylor@SmokeBurns.com

The Actual Incident

The above simulation is based on a fire that occurred in a Two-Storey Duplex in Iowa, USA (1999).

To study a computerized simulation of the actual incident visit the free download on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (USA) web site by clicking the link below:

NIST

Tragically three fire-fighters lost their lives at this incident, but not before they had rescued two of the three children trapped on the upper floors. Sadly, however the three children also

lost their lives.

The computerized simulation of the fire by the National Institute of Standards and Technology was an extremely accurate account of the fire development and provides a clear understanding of how and why the circumstances deteriorated so fast.

The fire-fighters brave and courageous rescue of two of the children and re-entry to rescue the third child is testimony to the dedication to duty and under extremely arduous conditions they did not hesitate to perform these rescues.

They did what most fire-fighters would have done, faced with similar circumstances on the day and went for the snatch rescue of the children on the upper floor.

To make sense of this tragic loss and prevent it happening again should we re-visit the clear and definitive outcomes of the fire development of this fire provided by the computerized model and then apply it to the current standard operational procedures (SOPs) and evaluate if our understanding of fire development was improved would this newly acquired knowledge be sufficient to develop improved tactics to prevent future similar in the line of duty deaths (LODD) of fire-fighters?

I believe it is a journey worth exploring and should be made as a tribute and testimony to the bravery of the fallen fire-fighters.

There are striking similarities between the incident above and a house/structure fire in Blaina, South Wales (UK) in 1996 in which tragically two fire-fighters and one child also lost their lives.

To explore this proposed better understanding I shall put forward my views on the fire development in this fire. What I believe the signs on arrival were indicating and their meaning and how a diagnostic approach can impact on your deployment. The control of the 'air flows' is paramount in my opinion. I will give visitors to the web site some time to absorb the information provided and then return to discuss and debate these fire development educational and training issues further.

I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you for your attention, interest and patience so far.

John Taylor

0900 hours

Wednesday 18 July 2007

We have now received various deployments for the Duplex Fire above and I shall post these for perusal below identifying only the region in the world that they originate......no names,

no pack drill......

Study these responses and compare them to your own current methodology:

DEPLOYMENTS  

Number One

The fire in the lower back room with black smoke indicates to me that the fire room may be open to the stairwell going upstairs. With the fire breathing through the lower floor window and knowing there are occupants on the upper floor to be rescued, I have two options knowing what is given from the walk around: 

OPTION No. 1 

Fog through the window in the back exposure, make entry through that adjacent back door, closing it behind me, and see if the room could be closed to the rest of the structure. If it could not be closed off then fog the rooms, moving past the fire room and up the stairwell for an upper floor search and rescue.  

OPTION No.2 

Make entry through the lower floor front door, closing it behind me. Attempt to locate the fire room and shut it off from the rest of the structure or isolate the stairwell somehow from the fire room. Fog the ceilings of the rooms as we move through and move up the stairwell for an upper floor search and rescue. With the single resource at my disposal for both options above, I would leave one person outside for Incident Command and Communications and complete the search and rescue with two fire-fighters.  

Park County, Montana. USA. – 23 July 2007. 

Number Two

I am very impressed with your web site. Now as I remember from way back in 1999, you gave us fire safety dinosaurs a presentation on a Friday morning on this very subject. On a similar house fire scenario where firefighters lost their lives, I remember you asking us all, having drawn the scenario on a flip chart. What would you do as an Officer-in-Charge? I remember we all sat in silence for a bit, no one wanting to steal the thunder, or else no one wanting to make a fool of themselves, someone said just as I was thinking, get the fire-fighters in with water and search, and as soon as they are available get other fire-fighters into fight the fire, which was undoubtedly originating in the kitchen.

I remember you saying that’s exactly what happened, but yet still they got killed. So what’s going wrong, we THINK, we know what we are doing in such a situation, because we are fire-fighters, but if we do know what we are doing. Why are we losing our lives in the process?

It is my opinion that the fire did start in the kitchen, I say that because there is clear fire showing, the black smoke throughout looks like it is leading to a flashover situation, and the gray smoke is getting hotter by the second, I believe you do need an opening and an exit route for fresh air and hot smoke, fresh air in through the door and hot smoke out through the window, in this case the upper one.

Grampian, Scotland - 24 July 2007.

Number Three

Topside ventilation coordinated with an aggressive VES (Vent, Enter and Search) tactic

(simply use the ground ladder to take out the window and then up and over you go for the quick search) over the front porch would have been crucial here. It appears that we were only dealing with a relatively small fire in the kitchen area that produced probably high heat and smoke conditions on the upper floors. The initial "lazy smoke" upon arrival would have lead me to believe that we were nearing a very volatile situation and that ventilation would need to be conducted prior to hose line advancement. The known rescues coupled with possible staffing issues make this a very difficult incident to predict.

If the only unit on the scene was the Engine Co. then VES with two going above the fire and direction for the operator to vent the rear kitchen area would have been the only choice.  As usual, it's hard to Monday morning quarterback, but this is a truly a situation were we must carry out our duties to save a life. The only question would have been, based on response time and time of notification was the area in question even viable for human life????

Thanks for the opportunity to express my views. Great web site.

Fairfax County, Virginia. USA - 4 August 2007.

Number Four

My response is based mainly on our larger metro fire dept.:

Actions

Nos.1 & 2 - Charged hose line to the front door. Truck Company to ready for outside ventilation based on possible location of the children. Lap the building. Rescue Company prepare for search. Entry and ventilation must be done as simultaneously as possible.

Adding air to this building is not going to be pretty!

No.3 - Although the likelihood of the children's survival can be argued,
since there does not appear to be flame impingement to the upper floors
rescue must be attempted. The first line is for fire-fighter/rescue
protection only. I would send up the stairs to protect the rescue crew.

No. 4 - My second line is going to head towards the fire in the kitchen.
After opening the door the fire should have begun to spread towards the
front and the second line will, hopefully, extinguish the fire or at
least drive it back to help protect the stairs.

No. 5 - That very turbulent smoke tells me that the heat in the house is
great. (Again, the children's survivability is questionable by now but civilians
don't get that.) A rescue attempt should be made if everything is in
place. 

This is one of those that you would be damned if you do and damned if
you don't, but I don't even think that in hindsight the fire gods could argue
much about trying. I would not, however, ever send a line in that
wasn't charged first. And this house was screaming (look at the smoke!).

For ventilation, we are lucky enough to have resources near each other. Our first dues

are 6-7 minutes and 2nds will come in close behind.

I will take a look at the other incident (Fire at Harrow Court) and maybe add my 2 cents.

Fairfax County, Virginia. USA - 8 August 2007.
 

The following deployment is provide by our French colleagues in Yvelines and their translation is excellent and far better than any of my attempts would be to provide a French version - 'tres bien'.

Number Five

Three Tactical considerations tightly linked:

1. Three children trapped upstairs.

2. Fire room on the lower floor, under ventilated – risk of rapid fire development.

3. Four fire-fighters on the scene.

Team A

Attack/Search and Rescue Team consisting of two fire-fighters with branch/nozzle

3D entry procedure by the front entrance, then rapid advance on the right towards the kitchen, fast attack then containment of the fire, vent for the fire is already been created (kitchen's window is partially open) protecting the staircase from fire growth.

3D gas cooling: medium pulses, large fog stream, low to medium flow for "safe zoning" in the hallway behind the entrance door and in the lower floor rooms on their way to the fire.

3D massive attack on the gases, then on the fire itself in the kitchen: long pulses, narrow fog stream, maximum flow to extinguish the fire - quick "penciling" onto the seat of the fire to stop decomposition and on the kitchen walls and ceiling ("painting"): straight and steady stream, low flow - additional vent for the fire is possible by breaking the whole kitchen window by a strong straight stream pulse (the glass will fail because of both the thermal and mechanic shocks).

Anti ventilation (maintaining the fuel rich mixture) is vital (especially downstairs: from the entry point to the kitchen itself) to prevent rapid fire progress (RFP) because of it’s under ventilated state:

- Downstairs doors need to be closed as much as possible, as the attack team advance

- Front door, any possible door leading to staircase, doors of living room, then the kitchen 

  door

- NO venting by opening windows downstairs as they advance

Back to the staircase and progress upstairs to assist search and rescue efforts and to keep on safe zoning by 3D gas cooling/confinement.

Team B

Search and Rescue Team: the Driver and the Lieutenant equipped if possible with Thermal Image Camera (TIC), Tools (breaking in), and a 'Can' (pressurized water fire extinguisher).

N.B. the VES option is not chosen as the adult escaped from the front bedroom and confirmed there are three children still on the upper floor presumably either in other bedrooms or the staircase enclosure.

Immediate entry behind the nozzle team (Team A) then rapid progression upstairs via the staircase for primary left hand search of the bedrooms.

Anti-ventilation/confinement of staircase (if possible) and of rooms searched by closing doors

Extrication possible ways:

• staircase (kept "safe" by the branch/nozzle team)
• front window on upper floor by the porch ladder (if confinement possible in the bedroom, if conditions are deteriorating in the staircase)

Following the successful rescue of the three children from this structure fire, the Driver and the Lieutenant and the back up fire-fighters administer first aid and CPR as required, whilst waiting for additional crews.

Yvelines, France – 14 August 2007.

Additional Responses to other aspects posed 2/3 minutes after opening up of the front door:

'Dynamic Risk Assessment'

The fire now breathes deeper by the front door lower part (neutral zone - half way) and develops faster (flames visible from the entire top half of the kitchen window) and releases energy (heavy and fast moving black smoke at the window on the upper floor and from the front door).

'Critical life safety factors' – if this 'air flow' is feeding freely an under ventilated fire, in a structure full of hot rich smoke, and a stronger ‘gravity current’ between downstairs and upstairs through the stair case (chimney) !!! The children are trapped on the upper floor and the staircase is the access to keep safe.

'Signs of Fire Development' - Increase ventilation: the whole front door compared to half of the window of the kitchen, which, means an increase in heat and energy production for the fire. Among some signs to look for and "read" are:

1. Neutral Zone – Half Way (smoke is banking down)

2. Heavy and volatile black smoke exiting through the openings at the front of the structure

3. No flames showing at the front of the structure, but the heat is increasing

4. Flames getting bigger at the rear of the structure.

A 'thermal runaway' (thanks to the front door) might lead to a RFP such as a hot 'rich' flashover downstairs from the kitchen into the living room. The flashover might cause another RFP such as a flash fire in the staircase and then onwards upstairs, but because of a yet high heat radiation by the smoke layer through the premises, sustained burning is possible after. Moreover, the flashover downstairs could produce a 'Smoke Explosion' (low pressure) upstairs through the kitchen ceiling.

To end up, as Chief James Braidwood (London Fire Brigade) wrote:

'The men of the fire brigade were taught to prevent, as much as possible, the access of air to the burning materials. What the open door of the ash-pit is to the furnace of a steam-boiler the open street door is to the house on fire. In both cases the door gives vital air to the flames'.........

 extract from his book - 'Fire Prevention & Fire Extinction' 1866.

Yvelines, France – 14 August 2007.

I’d like to take this opportunity to thank all those fire-fighting personnel who were kind and brave enough to submit a deployment to enable us to start the debate. Please find below my own personal views on the deployment of fire-fighting crews.

'Smoke Burns' Deployment. 

As the 'Incident Commander' of this Two-Storey Duplex fire incident depicted above. I'd firstly, 'read the fire gases' upon arrival from my front elevation vantage point. The movement of the black smoke emitting from the upper floor bedroom window and no flames showing at the front of the house/structure (ignitability of the smoke) and the lower and upper floors seemingly fully charged with black smoke and if there is no basement, this enables me to diagnose that the seat of the fire is on the lower floor at the rear of the premises and has a limited 'air supply' feeding the fire, which indicates it is from a small opening such as a window, otherwise the movement of the exiting black smoke would be faster and the back pressure created by the black smoke would have been overcome. The colour of the smoke - black also confirms the fuel mixture is lacking oxygen and is rich and that all the doors from the seat of the fire to the staircase enclosure and up into the front bedroom on the upper floor are ALL open.

My clear and definite objective at this fire and every fire is to 'safely deploy my fire-fighting crews to search for any trapped persons in this house/structure fire and rescue them by removal to fresh air and commencement of first aid and CPR as required in the shortest timeline possible' and not necessarily to fight the fire. The fire is a consequence of my attendance to perform our primary function 'saving lives', which includes first and foremost the lives of the fire-fighters and their safety and security is paramount, because if the fire-fighters are injured or killed then the persons trapped will not be rescued.

Now, having 'read the fire gases, before I make a decision on my preferred deployment I’d ask the adult occupier of the house/structure the following questions: 

1. Does the Two-Storey Duplex have a basement?
2. Are there any doors into the lower floor living room from the stairwell or is it open plan?
3. If there are doors and a hallway, where are the doors located and how many are there?

The occupier's responses in this particular fire scenario, would have been to confirm there is no basement and that there is a hallway at the foot of the stairwell, which has two doors leading into the lower floor living room both on the right hand wall with one next to the front door and the other further down the hallway.

Now, I have enough information regarding the fire development and the layout of the house/structure to complete my 'size-up' and deploy my fire-fighting crews accordingly to achieve my stated objective above. With all the doors open from the seat of the fire to the upper floor front bedroom window, am being confronted with one large single fire room compartment extending over two floors and flames emitting out of a rear lower floor window.

Actions

The driver/pump operator would engage the pump and send a message confirming persons are reported trapped (an assistance message ensuring automatic dispatch of supporting fire appliances/engines and ambulance/paramedics) and then position a positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fan in the vicinity of the front door and crank it up ready for use and leave it idling and pointing away from the front door towards the adjacent property.

As 'Incident Commander' (Security Officer), me and the two fire-fighters would form the breathing apparatus search and rescue team with full personal protective equipment (PPE) and radio communications and the two fire-fighters running off the high pressure piercing hose reel branch/nozzle, which creates the optimum water spray droplet size with enough hose reel tubing to reach the upper floor bedrooms. I’d run out a low pressure high flow branch/nozzle (back up branch/nozzle - security) with enough hose to reach upstairs if required.

Then, the fire-fighters would crack open the front door and 'read the fire gases' with the front door open (dynamic risk assessment) to observe an increase in the movement of the black smoke emitting from the upper floor front bedroom window and black smoke also exiting via the front door on 'over pressure', to observe that the warm/hot black smoke now emitting from these two exit ports with force is not igniting on contact with air and there are still no flames showing at the front of the house/structure.

Another important physical indication to observe is that after opening the front door the

'Horizontal position of the neutral zone (NZ) ' (bottom edge of the black smoke layer) has risen from approximately 450 millimeters (mm) (18 inches) above floor level to half way between the hallway floor and ceiling. This confirms that 'air' is now entering on the ‘under pressure’ via the bottom half of the open front door and feeding the flames exiting the exit port at the rear of the premises and forcing them out the complete window opening and the flames are no longer getting a limited 'air' supply from the bottom half of the failed kitchen window. The 'air' supply is now solely from the open front door, which is also diluting the previously rich mixture in the kitchen and living room areas via the 'air track' enabling the flames to also progress unilaterally along the ceilings of the lower floor kitchen and living room and towards the staircase enclosure.

This observation confirms that the door to fire room compartment is open and if I leave the front door open the 'air supply' entering on the 'under pressure' into the house/structure will over come the back pressure created by the black smoke and the house/structure will light up.

I completely agree with Chief Braidwood's visionary statement above, regarding 'air flows' written some 141 years ago.

Why do I want to let 'air' feed this fire?

Why don't I control the 'air flows' and maintain a state of oxygen deficiency/over carburetion, whilst I complete the search and rescue operations? 

'Air Management' – is the name of the game.

I am going to make this rich mixture work in my favour and close the front door momentarily to revert back to the status quo and run through the game plan with the fire-fighters. They are now going to re-enter through the front door taking with them enough coiled hose reel and the high pressure piercing hose reel branch/nozzle to search the hallway and cooling the black smoke (fire gases) as they enter. Once they are inside, am going to close the front door onto the hose reel tubing maintaining a balanced rich fuel mixture, because most of the black smoke cannot escape and very little air is now entering via the closed too front door. Their first objective is to find the door into the living room adjacent to the front door and close it, as soon as this is achieved they would radio confirmation to myself and then with my back up branch/nozzle available (security), I’d carefully re-open the front door to observe any changes in the black smoke movement emitting from the upper floor bedroom window and the front door. I do this in case the other door to the living room is open or there is a second seat of fire in the hallway.

However, at this particular fire I would observe that the black smoke emitting has lost its momentum, which confirms to me that by closing the living room door. We  have successfully isolated the ignition source (seat of the fire) from the black smoke (fuel) remaining in the staircase enclosure and the upper floor. Now I can safely position the PPV fan towards the front door and ventilate all this black smoke out of the already existing exit port (upper floor front bedroom window) and direct my fire-fighters to ascend upstairs to complete the search and rescue of the three reported trapped children, cooling as they go and as their 'security officer', I remain at the front door feeding them the rest of the hose reel, whilst also covering them with the low pressure branch/nozzle adjacent to the front door, being careful not to obstruct the ‘air flow’ from the PPV fan, providing security and protection in case the fire breaks through from the living room.

The ventilation of the black smoke from the staircase enclosure and upper floor would not take very long, because the positive pressure air would vacate the house/structure via the 'air track' through the front bedroom window and all the residual black smoke in the other bedrooms would be sucked into the 'air flow' and we would achieve the following three things virtually simultaneously;

• Easy and quick location of the children, because of the clear visibility.
• Provision of fresh air to the children by removal of the toxicity.
• Removal of the fuel (smoke) and limitation of fire spread – ignitability.

Three for one, not a bad return on your deployment and most importantly the three children are rescued in the shortest possible timeline, giving them the best possible chance of survival, with the integral safety and security of the fire-fighting crews being maintained throughout the search and rescue operations and the fire has not got any worse.

The only room on the upper floor that would not be automatically ventilated by the PPV fan would be the bathroom, which as seen from the rear of the premises contains grey smoke, because this was the only door on the upper floor that was closed upon arrival of the fire service/department. The fact that grey smoke was showing confirms the door was closed and the grey smoke was due to seepage from the black smoke in the staircase enclosure. Following the successful ventilation of the black smoke from the upper floor, then the PPV fan can be temporarily re-directed away from the front door and after having firstly cooled the grey smoke, then entry can be affected into the bathroom by the fire-fighters to search and rescue and subsequently ventilate.

Following the handing over of the three rescued children to ambulance/paramedic crews, I’d resume the search and rescue operations on the lower floor.

Firstly, we would relocate to the flaming kitchen window and insert water spray droplets into the 'under pressure' region (air intake below the flames) and let physics do the work and watch the water spray droplets be transported on the 'air track' to the seat of the fire and beyond through the flame front back to the top half of the kitchen window and effectively extinguish the fire in the combustible gas layer by removal of one side of the triangle of combustion – heat.

Once, the flames have been extinguished from the fire side of the house/structure by use of the 'under pressure extinguishing technique', we would return to the lower floor hallway and the fire-fighters would pierce through the wall above the door to the lower floor living room with their high pressure piercing hose reel branch/nozzle and inject the optimum size water spray droplets into the black smoke layer inside the closed up fire room compartment, creating inertia of the fire gases on the lower floor.

Then, having closed all doors leading on to the the upper floor staircase enclosure, redirect the PPV fan towards the open front door and in a coordinated operation open the rear kitchen door and then the living room door furthest down the lower floor hallway and ventilate the inert fire gases and steam from the living room and kitchen area, with the fire-fighters following up into these rooms to complete their search and rescue operations of the lower floor and upon location of the seat of the fire dampen down the original ignition source and last but not least they’d check the lower floor bathroom, dealing with the grey smoke inside in a similar manner as explained for the upper floor bathroom.

Upon reflection what have we achieved by adopting these SOPs?

1. The rescue of three trapped children on the upper floor in the shortest time possible.
2. The maintenance of the safety and security of the fire-fighting crews throughout the incident and their safe return home to their families.
3. Completion a full search of the remainder of house/structure.
4. Limiting the fire damage to the lower floor kitchen area.

All successfully completed with the minimum of resources and achievable because of an in-depth knowledge and understanding of how and why 'smoke burns' and access to safe realistic responsible practical training in these SOPs in fire development simulators (FDS).

This is why I made the informed choice to adopt these SOPs and if you feel these tactics I've advocated have some creditability and would like more insight into these search and rescue techniques and extinguishing techniques. I’d recommend you reserve a copy of my book - 'Smoke Burns'.

In my opinion these SOPs are worthy of further investigation and research. Please click NIST to re-visit the Simulation of the fire dynamics of a Fire in a Two-Storey Duplex and go to

Figure No.21 and click on the flame animation, but this time in your minds eye imagine the living room door is closed.

What would be the extent of the fire development on a re-run of the computer model for this fire and if the SOPs I am advocating where factored in and the living room door had been closed?

The fire development of this Two-Storey Duplex fire and the Blaina fire mentioned above are incredibly similar and I believe that if the fire-fighting crews at both incidents had been taught the relevance and importance of controlling the 'air flows' and been trained in the practical application of these SOPs. Then the simple action of closing the door between the living room and the staircase enclosure at both fires could have possibly saved the lives of the five fire-fighters who tragically died in the line of duty, whilst bravely performing search and rescue operations in these house/structure fires.

John Taylor – York. England – 26 August 2007.

Disclaimer

Further Deployments

Hopefully, these deployments will stimulate some debate and discussion on a way forward and upon receipt of the various viewpoints I will post them on the web site accordingly and offer further deployments for fire-fighters who may not have access to or are reluctant to use PPV fans or high pressure piercing hose reel branch/nozzles.

Further Deployments (Continued)

Please excuse the pause in the debate on the deployments at the Iowa Duplex Fire scenario. This is due to the launch of my recently completed book ‘Smoke Burns’, which has been quite time consuming, because we have completed the process from start to finish ourselves, writing the book, developing a web site, proofing, printing, publishing and finally distributing the book.

The most daunting aspect was:

How do I get a book printed, published and distributed?

As it turns out the process is straight forward and I will draft an article upon this subject in the near future and post it on the ‘About Us’ section.

However, we are now back on track and I received the following observations from a friend and very knowledgeable and experienced Scottish CFBT Instructor.

Number Six

Greetings John,

 
I have looked at the articles section, really good. I did work my way through it, the example is a good little teaser. Although I did agree with your means of tackling that fire, I am sure there is more than one way to solve a problem, although I was slightly confused that the layout of the building was known already, i.e. that a door into the lower floor living room could be closed and it's integrity could be trusted.

Grampian, Scotland – 23 September 2007.

'Smoke Burns' Further Deployments.

The above observations are extremely valid and an aspect worthy of note and deliberation. The earlier deployment of using VES (Vent, Enter and Search) via the upper floor bedroom window to perform the rescue of the trapped persons was also an excellent deployment based on the ‘reading of the fire gases’ and ‘size-up’ upon arrival.

Firstly, we shall delve a bit deeper into the observation above regarding the layout of the lower floor living room, the ‘Smoke Burns’ deployment is based upon what crews would have actually found after they entered the front door and their ‘Security Officer’ had closed the door too, onto the hose reel based on the stated facts in the NIST report.

The integrity of the door cannot be trusted, which is why I advocate the deployment of a three person search and rescue team with a ‘Security Officer’ located at the front door with a covering branch/nozzle and radio communications for additional protection of the crew.

However, you must be able to tackle every scenario and if upon entry through the front door the crew notice the lack of corridors and doorways and conclude that the lower floor is open plan and the possibility of isolating the ignition source (seat of the fire in the kitchen) by closing the living room door is not an option.

What are your alternative tactics for this scenario?

This is where the VES deployment comes into play and is a viable option and withdrawal from the lower floor and re-deployment of crews via ladder through the upper floor bedroom window, having ensured the front door has been closed, thereby limiting the air supply to the fire in the kitchen to a minimum via the lower part of the kitchen window.

This option is a safer deployment compared to entrance via the front door and a snatch rescue up the staircase to the bedrooms on the upper floor, whilst leaving the front door open.

My only personal concern with this particular VES deployment is:

What would happen if another lower floor window failed in the fire room compartment and the fire got the additional air it requires to extend from the lower floor to the upper floor via the open staircase?

How do the crews deployed on the VES option protect themselves from the flame front advancing up the staircase?

There would be a plausible way to make the VES option even safer.

What could this be?

My good friend Jim Mastin – Chief Fire Officer of Livingston Fire/ Rescue Department, Montana, USA, has always used the analogy of the damper in a wood stove, if you close the damper in the flue and prevent the smoke from exiting to fresh air and create a oxygen deficient and fuel ‘rich’ mixture in the flue the fire cannot travel up the flue and will only burn adjacent to the seat of the fire with the air from the opening at the base.

Hence, if you choose the VES deployment and entered via the front bedroom window.

What could the crews do immediately to protect themselves before they searched this bedroom?

What do you think would happen to the fire development if they closed the front bedroom door to the staircase enclosure? 

You would have effectively closed the damper in this flue (house/structure fire) and restricted the ‘air flows’ from the kitchen to the open front bedroom window via the staircase.

This provides additional protection by reducing the possibility of another window on the lower floor failing.

But, following the search of the front bedroom, we need to progress and search the remaining upper floor bedrooms.

How do you keep the front bedroom door closed during the extended search with the movement of the hose reel opening this door?

Upon realisation that the lower floor is open plan,

‘We’ve got a couple of options’:

OPTION A

• Commit the search and rescue team upstairs cooling as they go with the ’Security Officer’ remaining at the front door controlling the ‘air flows’, feeding in the hose reel and cooling the fire gases in the ceiling at the foot of the staircase with the right size droplets, which do not produce super heated steam, more like water vapour and effectively creating the desired inertia to protect the crew upstairs. The crew upstairs would search the front bedroom first and once confirmed clear close this door and proceed to search the remaining upper floor rooms.

My personal reservations with Option A are the exposure of the fire-fighters and the fact there is no 'get out clause', with no ladder positioned at the front bedroom window and any rescues would entail these persons being brought downstairs thorough a flammable and toxic atmosphere with poor visibility.

OPTION B

• Proceed to extinguish the fire in the lower floor kitchen and then proceed upstairs to perform the required search and rescue.

The time constraints involved in extinguishing the fire may be counter productive to my stated objective of rescuing the persons trapped in the building in the shortest possible timeline.

OPTION C

• Withdraw the crew and close the front door, re-deploy and make entry via a ladder through the front bedroom window, cooling the black smoke as they proceed to the bedroom door to close it, then confirm via radio communications with the 'Security Officer' that the black smoke previously exiting the front bedroom window with movement has stopped flowing, confirming the black smoke in the front bedroom has been isolated from the ignition source (seat of fire in the kitchen) making it now safe to ventilate, then proceed to the window and ventilate the black smoke by using 'water fogging ventilation techniques', effectively clearly the room and removing the flammable and toxic risk, whilst simultaneously creating the visibility to search the bedroom. Additionally, this procedure makes the front bedroom a safe haven for the fire-fighters in the later stages of the search and rescue operations, following completion of the search in this bedroom, withdraw to re-deploy via the front door. Then, when the second fire-fighter is out of the front bedroom window and starting their descent down the ladder, I’d re-deploy the ‘Security Officer’ with the covering branch/nozzle to outside the lower floor kitchen window and use the ‘under pressure extinguishing technique’ and insert water droplets into the lower part of the kitchen window (under pressure region) and effectively put the fire in neutral. Then, return to the front door and re-deploy the crew via the front door and up the staircase to search the remaining bedrooms, cooling as they go. The ‘Security Officer’ remains at the front door controlling the ‘air flows’ with the front door closed too, onto the hose reel, feeding in the hose reel and cooling the fire gases in the ceiling at the foot of the staircase through the gap between the front door and the door frame. Upon location of the persons trapped the crews can exit the upper floor via the front bedroom, taking their branch/nozzle with them and leaving it in the staircase enclosure, directly outside the front bedroom door and closing this bedroom door behind them and pass the rescued persons to ‘Security Officer’ to carry down the ladder, whilst the pump operator/driver foots the ladder and hand over the rescued persons to the paramedics. The ‘Security Officer’ having already tied a belt line around the handle of the front door and secured it in the closed too position. Then re-deploy through the front bedroom door, following confirmation from the ‘Security Officer’ that they are back on post at the front door, with care being taken whilst opening the bedroom door to retrieve the branch/nozzle and closing the front bedroom door behind them, whilst they continue search and rescue operations on the upper floor and repeating this process until all the persons trapped are rescued and confirmation received that the upper floor is clear. Then I’d ensure the crews as they finally withdrew closed all the doors on the upper floor as a precautionary measure to limit any fire development that may occur whilst re-deploying to search the lower floor and extinguish the fire.   

Of the three deployment options, my preferred choose would be OPTION C, because it achieves the rescue of the persons trapped in the shortest possible timeline, whilst maintaining the security and safety of the fire-fighters performing the rescues by controlling the ‘air flows’, which prevents the fire developing during the search and rescue procedures.

John Taylor - York, England - 29 September 2007.

Disclaimer

The further deployments above are for discussion and debate and I’d be grateful for your opinions and feedback or alternative deployments to progress the educational process and extend our horizons to try and progress towards providing a safer working environment for fire-fighters worldwide.

If you'd like to make comments on these deployments. Please feel free to contact me

John Taylor@SmokeBurns.com